Real Time Advanced Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring in DLR’s Multi-Antenna GNSS Receiver by Rippl, Markus
Real Time Advanced Receiver Autonomous
Integrity Monitoring in DLR’s Multi-Antenna
GNSS Receiver
Markus Rippl, German Aerospace Center (DLR)
BIOGRAPHY
Markus Rippl received his Diploma in Electrical Engineer-
ing and Information Technology from Technische Universität
München (TUM) in 2007. Since then, he has been a research
fellow with the Institute of Communications and Navigation
(IKN) at the German Aerospace Center (DLR), in Oberpfaf-
fenhofen near Munich. His ﬁeld of work is the integrity of
GNSS-based navigation using receiver-side algorithms.
ABSTRACT
The present paper introduces a real-time implementa-
tion of Advanced Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitor-
ing (ARAIM) implemented in DLR’s array antenna receiver
“GALANT”. The receiver is capable of tracking multiple
frequency measurements both from GPS and Galileo signals.
The position, velocity and time (PVT) unit and the Multi-
Hypothesis Solution Separation (MHSS) based ARAIM unit
are closely coupled and operate in a real-time processing
environment within the receiver demonstrator.
The presented MHSS based RAIM is extended with Fault
Detection and Exclusion (FDE) functionality that can identify
large measurement faults in one or multiple range measure-
ments, and adapt its measurement model to mitigate the
effects of such biases. Different concepts to obtain such FDE
functionality are discussed and compared.
A series of measurements using the Galileo Testbed GATE
has been recorded and processed in real time using the
presented hardware/software platform. Feared event scenarios
were generated by introducing biases to one or multiple
pseudorange observations on signal level, i.e. at the GATE
processing facility. The PVT and integrity results for nominal
and feared event scenarios are presented. The ability of MHSS
ARAIM to provide a robust navigation solution in the presence
of such large faults is assessed and the improvement of
positioning accuracy introduced through the application of
FDE methods is demonstrated.
I. INTRODUCTION
ARAIM was introduced in [1], [2] and derived from [3]. It
is a RAIM method capable of obtaining navigation integrity
for stand-alone users and was designed to exploit the high
number and quality of GNSS signals that will be available
in the future. As opposed to classical weighted least square
RAIM [4] it allows for more stringent integrity requirements
like for precision approach of aircraft. The most remarkable
improvement is in its ability to bound position errors (i.e.
protection levels) under nominal, single or multiple fault
conditions. The measurement error model which constitutes
the foundation of PL computation is is described as a random
variable whose distribution is over bounded by a non centered
Gaussian distribution. It is assumed in the whole paper that
the ionosphere error is corrected using a dual frequency
ionosphere free combination.
It is expected that upon the availability of next-generation
GNSS signals from GPS, Galileo, GLONASS and Compass,
the worldwide integrity performance using ARAIM will be
sufﬁcient to provide LPV-200 navigation capability without
the need of conventional augmentation systems such as WAAS
or EGNOS [5]. While standardization of ARAIM and the
underlying assumptions is in its initial phase [6], [7], it is
already conceivable that a large step is made in terms of
algorithm complexity by transitioning from slope-based RAIM
to ARAIM. Even at the pace of performance increase in
today’s embedded hardware design, the nature of ARAIM still
may limit the feasibility of implementation in avionics in the
medium term.
Studies investigating the expected ARAIM performance
have been implemented using service volume simulators such
as Stanford University’s MAAST framework [8], where the
user integrity algorithm is directly integrated into a simulation
process that generates nominal pseudorange residuals. Func-
tional veriﬁcation and demonstration of its performance using
real data has already been presented in various works [9], [10],
[11]. Previous studies apply both current GPS-L1/L2 data from
semi-codeless receivers and multi constellation data by the use
of GLONASS signals.
The novelty of the present paper is the combination of real
GPS and Galileo data, particularly including the analysis of
feared event scenarios where ARAIM has to demonstrate its
robustness against the threats it was designed for. The genera-
tion of such fault scenarios on signal level was accomplished
by operating the receiver in the GATE Galileo Testbed [12] in
Berchtesgaden, Germany.
Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE) is the process of iden-
tifying large measurement faults and adapt the measurement
model of the underlying position estimation process to mitigate
the impact of such biases. The multiple hypotheses concept
in ARAIM inherently sets the foundation to fault detection
capabilities due to the fact that the solution separation deter-
mined for each single-fault hypothesis represents the impact
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of a single measurement bias on the position estimate. In
[13] we presented a novel FDE approach incorporating and
extending methods from [9] and [7]. A FDE method based
on this suggestion is implemented in the presented real-time
receiver platform and validate using feared-event scenarios.
It is demonstrated that the ARAIM-FDE is capable of fault
identiﬁcation and mitigation of the bias so that the resulting
position error remains at a nominal level, while retaining
integrity in terms of a robust vertical protection level (VPL).
A. DLR’s Multi-Antenna GNSS Receiver Platform
The GNSS receiver platform presented in this paper was
developed at the Institute of Communications and Navigation
in the German Aerospace Center (DLR) [14]. The main
objectives of the GALANT project were the development of
a GNSS receiver capable of receiving data from novel GNSS
signals, development of advanced methods for interference and
jamming mitigation [15], novel approaches to acquisition and
tracking [16], and the use of multiple antenna elements and
tracking channels to apply digital beam forming and estimate
the Direction-of-Arrival (DoA) for the received signals. After
reaching a consequent level of maturity, the GALANT plat-
form became ready to serve as a demonstration platform to
implement novel position, velocity and time estimation (PVT),
and integrity algorithms.
The GALANT hardware is a 2x2 active antenna array for
combined reception of L1 and L5 signals and a corresponding
RF front-end for down-conversion and digitalization of the
measurements. An FPGA based embedded environment is
used for interference countermeasures, acquisition and track-
ing, and the digital array processing employed to obtain beam
steering capabilities using the four antennas. The FPGA board
is directly connected to a host PC which serves for tracking
loop control, channel control and processing of the derived
data from the tracking loops [17]. Here, the pseudorange
measurements are extracted from the loop states, and the bit
stream containing the navigation data payload is computed.
Timestamps are extracted from the navigation data to refer
pseudorange observations to system time. Channel control and
interaction with the user interface is based in the PC software.
To allow for a modular development of PVT and Integrity
modules, the data collected at the receiver software side is
encapsulated in an extended set of RTCM3 messages and
made available over an Ntrip based network service. Thus,
it is possible to connect multiple PVT units to the receiver
and process multiple receiver data streams in a single pro-
cessing environment. Through the use of IP based networking
technology, a ﬂexible solution for common laboratory or
campaign measurements is possible. In the frame of presented
GATE measurements, the receiver PVT and Integrity modules
have been executed on a second PC platform connected via
Ethernet.
B. Weighted Least Squares Position Estimation
The PVT module can apply carrier smoothing if code and
carrier measurements are available simultaneously. However
in the presented data, no carrier phases were available and
thus, code based pseudoranges have been processed. Because
measurements from both E1 and E5 are available, the PVT
pre-processing module also supports the generation of Iono-
free linear combinations to mitigate the ﬁrst order ionospheric
delay. Due to the high noise level in entirely code-based
combinations, this option has not been selected for the pre-
sented data. In exchange, the ionospheric delay introduced
by the GATE environment has been completely mitigated by
application of the same Klobuchar model that was used in the
GATE processing facility.
Full decoding of the Galileo I/NAV and F/NAV bitstream is
also performed in the PVT module, which allows for a more
ﬂexible handling of current and past ephemeris data at instants
where the IOD (issue of data) is incremented.
The user position is estimated using a weighted least squares
iterative approach. The weighting of the pseudorange mea-
surements needs to be in line with the assumptions used in
the MHSS algorithm to compute the Protection Levels. The
two modules exchange the weighting coefﬁcients to assure this
property.
The combined PVT and ARAIM algorithm uses a NMEA
based network output to send its data to a user interface.
In order to allow for presentation of ARAIM-speciﬁc re-
sults in addition to the position estimates, proprietary NMEA
sentences have been included with the standardized NMEA
datagrams.
II. ADVANCED RECEIVER AUTONOMOUS INTEGRITY
MONITORING WITH MHSS
The algorithm adopted to guarantee navigation integrity is
based on multiple hypothesis[3] technique extended during the
past years to MHSS based RAIM [2], [18], [19], with a target
to fulﬁll the integrity requirements for precision approach [20].
ARAIM employs a multiple hypothesis approach to incor-
porate the potential effects of single or multiple satellite faults
into its prediction of the worst case error, the Protection Level
(PL). Any combination of faults is ﬁrst evaluated with respect
to its prior probability of occurrence. If a fault mode (i.e.,
one unique combination of faulted and healthy measurements)
is likely to occur, a subset of measurements excluding the
potential fault candidates is established and a subset based
position is estimated. With all hypothetical position solutions
merged into a union of possible positions, the resulting interval
is likely to contain a position solution which is based entirely
on fault free measurements. The remaining fault hypotheses
which were not considered in the interval constitute the set of
unmonitored hypotheses, where the sum probability of those
is required to be a fraction of the allowable integrity budget
applicable to a pre-deﬁned operational mode. For LPV-200
approaches, this integrity risk is deﬁned as Psat = 1 · 10−7.
A. Fault model
The model of satellite measurement faults is fundamental
to the presented integrity algorithm and is therefore shortly
reviewed. First, a satellite measurement is considered to be
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present either in a nominal state or in a faulted state. A
nominal satellite measurement is described by a measurement
fault model including both Gaussian and nominal bias terms.
This dual approach is chosen to account both for nominal
noise contributions resulting from fast-changing physical error
sources such as multipath and receiver noise, and for bias
contributions which stem from ephemeris and clock errors,
residual ionospheric errors and tropospheric errors. Those
biases are assumed to be slowly changing, and typically can be
modeled by a nominal magnitude and a maximum magnitude.
Both model parameters are applied at different stages of the
ARAIM-MHSS algorithm.
The Gaussian part of the measurement error is modeled with
the parameters σURE,i and σURA,i. The URA-based standard
deviation is a Gaussian overbound of the error noise. The bias
contribution is described through a nominal parameter bnom
and a “nominal maximum” bmax.
If the actual measurement error is modeled correctly, the
measurement or the satellite is said to be in nominal state. A
prior state probability needs to be deﬁned for every satellite
used in MHSS in order to compute a tree of hypotheses con-
taining the failure modes and their corresponding probability
of occurrence. Here, it is considered that this probability is
well known by means of continuous ground monitoring and
that the probability data is made available to the user algorithm
by an integrity data channel. The underlying architecture to
provide such functionality could either be based on GNSS
Integrity Channel (GIC) concepts or on concepts pursuing a
stand-alone approach for integrity monitoring, discussed under
the term Integrity Support Message (ISM) [7]. A probability
for constellation wide faults can be applied in a similar way;
if constellation wide failures need to be considered, the corre-
sponding hypotheses are established by excluding a complete
constellation. Of course, constellation wide faults can only
be included in the analysis if measurements from multiple
constellations are available, otherwise they are unobservable.
B. Deﬁnition of hypotheses
The selection process to determine which fault modes
constitute the tree of analyzed hypotheses can be implemented
as follows: First, a hypothesis tree combining all possible
combination of faults in a set of N visible satellites is
constituted. The overall number of hypotheses describing all
possible fault combinations including the no-faults hypothesis
is the cardinality of the set of hypotheses J:
|J| = J = N2 (1)
Assuming statistically independent fault states for individual
satellites (this is justiﬁable if error causes affecting multiple
satellites are modeled separately), the fault probability of a
single fault mode j with k faulted measurements can be given
as
Pap(k) = Psat
k · (1− Psat)N−k , (2)
and the total prior probability for all such fault modes with a
number of faulted measurements k is
∑
all j with k faults
Pap(k) =
(
N
k
)
· Pap(k). (3)
Here, the binomial coefﬁcient
(
N
k
)
has been introduced to
deﬁne the number of hypotheses that describe modes with
k satellite faults. To clearly deﬁne the prior probability of a
unique failure mode j, we introduce
∀j| k faults : Pap,j = Pap(k)
In a second step, the set of all possible fault modes in J
is partitioned in the set of hypotheses that are considered in
MHSS due to their high probability of occurrence JMHSS and
those which are unlikely to be present Junknown and therefore
can be neglected in the computation of the VPL.
J = JMHSS ∪ Junknown (4)
The parameter dmax deﬁnes the maximum number of con-
current satellite faults that need to be considered to establish
the MHSS search tree. To determine the maximum search
depth all higher order fault mode probabilities are computed
starting with the hypothesis excluding all n measurements.
Consecutively, hypothesis probabilities corresponding to fewer
concurrent faults are added. When a predeﬁned fraction of
the admissible integrity budget is taken by the sum of the
hypotheses, the loop terminates. When this fault probability
fraction has been exceeded and the maximum search depth
is ﬁxed, the remaining fault modes constitute the search tree
that needs be considered in MHSS. The remaining integrity
budget PHMI,MHSS = PHMI−Punknown is recorded to be allocated
between those fault modes at a later stage.
A simpler implementation approach considers only single
faults and uses a less general error model to estimate the
probability of multiple concurrent non-nominal measurement
errors. In this case, the integrity budget is simply reduced by
a ﬁxed margin allocated to multiple faults, and the remaining
budget is split between all one-fault hypotheses and the all-
in-view hypothesis.
The requirement of integrity risk needs to account for all
fault modes, including those in Junknown. A conditional prob-
ability P (HMI|j) deﬁnes the risk of Hazardous Misleading
Information (HMI) in case this fault mode applies.
PHMI ≥
J∑
j=0
Pap,j · P (HMI|j) (5)
Concerning consummation of integrity budget, the difference
between hypotheses in JMHSS and those not under consider-
ation (Junknown) is that the prior probability of the latter is
directly subtracted from the integrity budget, while hypotheses
in the tree only use a fraction of their prior probability in the
integrity budget domain. For each hypothesis under investiga-
tion the corresponding consummation of integrity budget is the
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product of its prior probability and a conditional probability
allocation given to the Gaussian overbound used in computing
the protection level.
For hypotheses not in the search tree, the conditional
probability of HMI, P (HMI|j) = 1. The corresponding a
priori state probability directly reduces the available integrity
budget.
∀j ∈ JMHSS : PHMI, = Pap,j · P (HMI|j) (6)
∀j ∈ Junknown : PHMI, = Pap,j (7)
Consequently, the size of the search tree JMHSS determines
the overall use of integrity risk in that considering more fault
modes, a smaller fraction of the integrity risk budget needs
to be allocated to unknown hypotheses in Junknown. In return,
more hypotheses with smaller geometries result in higher
partial VPLs (Vertical Protection Levels), thus limiting the
performance of the algorithm.
C. Computation of hypotheses VPLs
With the deﬁnition of a hypothesis tree capable of address-
ing all fault modes that need consideration within the required
integrity budget, a partial VPL for every fault mode can be
computed. While the ARAIM ﬂavor currently discussed on
international basis [7] only applies geometry based informa-
tion to determine the VPL and employs measurement data
to perform a fault check on the result, the implementation
presented here follows [2] and computes a “Real-Time VPL”
based on measurements in addition to the predictive VPL.
While the prediction VPL stays stationary in case of a satellite
fault and is only invalidated by the underlying test, the Real-
Time VPL incorporates any position biases caused by such
fault and thus inﬂates when faults are present.
The fundamental philosophy connected with such measure-
ment based error bounds is that it is possible to determine a
robust error bound also in the presence of large faults. Whether
it is desirable that navigation integrity is still available when
the error bound is exceedingly high depends on the use case.
For LPV-200, a real-time VPL higher than its prediction but
still below the vertical alert limit (VAL) of 35m can still be
useful to obtain navigation capability for precision approach.
On the other hand, a more conservative approach uses the
real-time data just to detect those fault events and disable
navigation in such cases.
Both the prediction VPL and the real-time VPL apply a
nominal error model based on biases and Gaussian over-
bounds. The model accounts for any nominal error contribu-
tions of the satellite measurements which are hypothetically
assumed to be undistorted within the hypothesis. In addition,
each partial VPL is increased by a solution separation expres-
sion which takes into account the vertical offset of the position
estimate that is introduced by exclusion of those satellites that
are considered faulty.
In the following developments, the following deﬁnitions
shall hold: The hypothesis search tree consists of J hypothe-
ses, and j is an index for a single hypothesis. The index 0
corresponds to the all-in-view hypothesis. The size of the all-
in-view geometry is N , and n is an index to denote a single
measurement.
The solution separation for real-time VPL is obtained from
the difference of the vertical all-in-view position solution and
the partial solution.
dj = |∆xj −∆x0| (8)
Each partial solution is obtained from the pseudorange
residuals, projected into the vertical position domain by ap-
plying a pseudoinverse speciﬁc for the hypothesis, where mea-
surements corresponding to faulted SVs have been canceled:
∆xj = hvSj∆y (9)
hv = [0 0 1 0]
Sj =
(
GTMjWURAG
)−1
GTMjWURA (10)
The pseudoinverse Sj is derived from the geometry matrix
G, the weighting matrix based on the URA error model
WURA and an identity matrix with zeroed diagonal elements
at the position of excluded satellites, Mj . The prediction
of the partial VPL estimates a maximum of the fault-free
solution separation, employing the probability required for
service continuity [7]:
Dj = Kffd,jσdV,j +
N∑
n=1
|∆Sj(3, n)| · bnom (11)
∆Sj = Sj − S0 (12)
The variance of the Gaussian overbound modeling the
vertical solution separation is derived using the nominal vari-
ances of the measurement errors (URE) and the nominal bias
magnitudes. The tail probability of the Gaussian overbound
results from the continuity requirement Pfa.
σdV,j =
√
dPj(3, 3) , where (13)
dPj = ∆SjWURE
−1∆STj (14)
Kffd,j = −Q−1
(
Pfa
2J
)
(15)
Computation of the partial VPLs follows the same approach
for both the real-time Protection Level and the prediction
VPLj = Dj +Kmd,jσV,j +
N∑
n=1
|∆Sj(3, n)| · bmax, (16)
where the standard deviation of the nominal vertical position
error results from
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σV,j =
√
Pj(3, 3) (17)
Pj =
(
GTMjWURAG
)−1
(18)
The real-time protection level VPLRT applies pseudorange
residuals to determine the actual solution separation for the
present set of observations. The VPL equation is
VPLRT,j = dn +Kmd,nσV,n +
N∑
i=1
|∆Sn(3, i)| · bmax. (19)
The overall protection levels are derived from the maximum
of all corresponding partial VPLs.
VPL = max
all j
VPLj (20)
VPLRT = max
all j
VPLRT,j (21)
D. Additional LPV-200 requirements
The LPV-200 precision approach requirements have been
established to allow for using SBAS-augmented GNSS naviga-
tion for precision approaches down to 200ft vertical visibility.
Performance requirements are partially loosened compared to
CAT-I, where the vertical alert limit for such navigation is
10m. When LPV-200 is applicable, the vertical requirement for
the maximum possible position estimation error is 35m. Since
a 35m vertical offset of an airplane at 200ft ceiling can pose
signiﬁcant workload to pilots when the plane arrives above the
threshold at too high altitude, a secondary requirement was es-
tablished to limit the vertical error in fault-free conditions to a
15m. The error bound is called Effective Monitoring Threshold
(EMT) and its corresponding integrity risk is required to be
below PEMT = 10−5. Another Protection Level requirement at
10m has been introduced [21], [20], and the nominal vertical
accuracy is required to be below 4m.
Although previous studies suggest that the EMT require-
ment is likely to constrain performance even more than the
VPL [5], the presented results only analyze the VPL require-
ment.
E. Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE)
MHSS based ARAIM can support different methods to
detect and identify non-nominal measurement errors. A fun-
damental principle of ARAIM-based fault detection lies in
monitoring the solution separation which is a direct measure of
the impact of measurement biases in the observations. Since
the solution separation performs a projection of such biases
into the vertical position domain, biases detection takes into
account each biases signiﬁcance with respect to the resulting
position error.
A fault monitoring approach suggested in [7] compares the
solution separation directly with its prediction to determine if
one of the excluded measurements has an unusual magnitude:
HFDE,j : dj > Dj (22)
This test directly determines if the measurement excluded
in Hn corresponds to its model. If a fault is detected, the
availability of MHSS based integrity is declined. [7] does
not suggest an approach to mitigate such faults and perform
exclusion.
Another fault detection approach suggested in [9] is based
on an opportunistic attempt to always provide the user with
the best possible real-time VPL. It is founded on the as-
sumption that since the real-time implementation of ARAIM
uses measurement data instead of a fault model to determine
the solution separation it can be trusted to represent the real
position error impact of a potential bias in the measurements.
If it is assumed that users determines the availability of
ARAIM based on the real-time VPL, it is desirable to ﬁnd
a combination of measurements that yield the best possible
VPL. In nominal situations, the VPL derived from the all-in-
view solution tends to be optimal, because any exclusion of
satellites results in degradation of the geometry. If however the
exclusion of a satellite excludes a large bias, the corresponding
ARAIM VPL based on a reduced geometry does no longer
comprise a hypothesis solution separation where this bias is
excluded. Thus it is signiﬁcantly smaller than the all-in-view
ARAIM VPL.
However this approach is highly recursive and, without
additional tests performed before every epoch, leads to limita-
tions concerning the real-time capability of ARAIM even for
state-of-the-art PC based hardware.
A third method combines a-priori exclusion of measure-
ments with a previous test to reduce computational load [13].
Based on the all-in-view MHSS results, it is checked whether
VPLRT < VPL , (23)
and if the above test fails, a recursive search for smaller
real-time VPLs resulting from reduced geometries is started.
For every such candidate, it is checked whether the above
inequality (23) holds.
Under the assumption that the real-time VPL is robust, it
is not necessary that the FDE part meets any requirement
regarding missed detection. However the fault detection based
on an overall VPL is less strict than the hypothesis test,
which should be preferred if additional safety is considered
to be given by FDE. A detailed derivation is developed in
Appendix A.
III. ARAIM AND PVT INTEGRATION
MHSS utilizes output data that is derived in the PVT esti-
mation. Separate from the geometry and weighting matrices,
the pseudorange residuals are used to derive the solution
separation dj . Here, a single bias on one measurement does
not show up only in one pseudorange residual, but instead is
distributed to all residuals. This results from a dislocation of
the user position estimate and user clock offset estimate due
to the bias, which in return impacts the pseudorange residuals
in the converged all-in-view solution:
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∆y = (I−P)y (24)
= y −GSy
= y −Gxˆ
It results from (9) that the partial term in the solution
separation results from the set of pseudorange residuals ∆y
by application of the subset pseudoinverse Sj . With this oper-
ation, it is ensured that when computing the partial solution,
the entire bias which is distributed over ∆y is excluded.
∆xj = hvSj∆y (25)
= hvSj (I−GS0)y (26)
Figure 1 shows how a single bias on PRN E1 distributes
into all residuals.
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Figure 1. Observed pseudorange residuals with a measurement bias intro-
duced to measurements E1
IV. DEMONSTRATION OF INTEGRITY IN ARAIM
IMPLEMENTATION
The following section presents results obtained from Galileo
and GPS measurements taken in the GATE Test Environment
and using DLR’s GALANT receiver. For a nominal scenario
and for the case of two simultaneous large measurement biases
we show that the ARAIM VPL is robust with respect to the
user position error, and that FDE can successfully mitigate the
biases.
A. Galileo Test Environment (GATE)
GATE is a Galileo testbed situated in a mountainous area
in the south of Germany [12]. It consists of eight transmitter
stations (GTS) on mountain peaks surrounding the test area.
Although the elevation difference between the core testing area
and the transmitter stations is signiﬁcant, all signals arrive
at a relatively small elevation angle compared with satellite-
generated GNSS signals.
The test environment supports Virtual Satellite Mode (VSM)
where a GPS-based position feedback of the test user and
parallel feedback of the received GATE signals into the
processing core (GPF) are used to control signal phase and
power level. The emitted navigation data corresponds to the
measured ranges and imitates a complete space-borne GNSS
constellation. Up to eight signals can be simultaneously gen-
erated on all Galileo frequencies, where PRN changes are
executed under operation.
In addition to the reception of GATE signals, the GPS signal
is available in the test area as well. GATE can adapt to the
state of the current GPS space segment by using the same
Klobuchar parameters that are currently valid for GPS in its
error model for the ionospheric delay.
B. Scenarios
Along with multiple interference scenarios [15], [16], the
GALANT Receiver was also tested in simulated feared event
scenarios especially designed to demonstrate MHSS robust-
ness against large measurement errors on one or multiple
satellite ranges. In this paper, we present results from a sce-
nario where two of the eight Galileo signals were affected by
pseudorange and carrier phase ramps during the measurement
run. Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the lapse
of pseudorange errors. The PRNs were selected such that
the impact of the bias on the vertical position error was
maximized for the ﬁrst measurement (E1), and the impact on
the horizontal error was maximized for the second PRN (E23).
This corresponds to the satellite with highest elevation at the
initialization of the error ramp and one satellite with very low
elevation.
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Figure 2. Pseudorange ramps generated on the two Galileo signals for PRNs
E1 and E23
The feared event scenarios were recorded simultaneously
with two GALANT receivers mounted on the test vehicle,
where one receiver was conﬁgured to track Galileo measure-
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ments on both OS frequencies (E1 and E5), and one receiver
recorded Galileo E1 and GPS L1 measurements.
C. GATE measurement error model
For the present work, both the signal types and the method
of signal generation produce variability to the properties of
the received signals. Satellite signals are generated artiﬁcially
by being transmitted from mountain peaks, where a dynamic
feedback process steers their code and carrier phases, as well
as signal power levels. The true direction of arrival does not
correspond with the simulated line of sight of the received
signals. Thus, elevation dependent modeling of multipath
contribution to the measurement error seems unjustiﬁable.
In addition, the E1 and E5 signals use different modulation
schemes than traditional GPS signals. Large measurement
biases may arise from impreciseness of the measured reference
position which is fed back into the processing facility of
GATE.
A ﬁrst basic attempt to model the pseudorange measurement
error encountered in this scenario is therefore pursued by
analysis of the pseudorange residuals in a fault-free envi-
ronment. Figure 3 presents an overlay of the pseudorange
residuals from both the GPS measurements (dotted) and the
Galileo measurements (solid). It can be seen that both groups
of observations are only minimally biased compared with
the visible measurement noise. In the present analysis, only
pseudorange observables have been considered which leads to
a higher noise level and limits the applicability of ionosphere-
free linear combinations from dual-frequency measurements.
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Figure 3. Pseudorange residuals from GATE and GPS measurements, fault
free scenario
A histogram of two selected Galileo (GATE) PRNs shows
that in fact the distribution of individual residuals seems to
consist of a bias term that is quasi-stationary over the duration
of the measurement, and a noise contribution which can
possibly be approximated by a Gaussian. Signiﬁcantly more
data would be needed however to validate these assumptions.
To guarantee robustness of an MHSS based ARAIM user
algorithm, it would be necessary to estimate the measurement
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Figure 4. Histogram of two residuals from GATE measurements
error model by a ground network in order to determine max-
imum Gaussian overbound and maximum bias contributions
for the satellites. Using the GATE facilities however does
not allow for such long-term observations. The demonstrated
capabilities of ARAIM are therefore limited to functional
proof, applying an error model that is probably too pessimistic.
D. Fault-free position error and ARAIM VPL
The presented fault free scenarios result from the same set
of data that was used for the feared event analysis. To obtain
fault-free data, the measurements containing the biases (PRNs
E01 and E23) were removed for this analysis.
The 3-D position error obtained from the fault-free scenario
suggests that the position estimation algorithm works correctly.
A small amount of divergence from the true position can be
accounted for imperfectness of the user position feedback that
was used to deﬁne the GTS signals, and of the lever arm
between the GATE user receiver and the GALANT receiver
under test. It corresponds well with the biases that can be
suspected from Figure 4.
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Figure 5. 3-D Position error in nominal scenario, based on Galileo+GPS
measurements
The high noise level in the user position estimate can again
be explained by the use of code-only measurements.
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A combined plot of the magnitude of the vertical position er-
ror, the real-time ARAIM VPL and the predicted ARAIM VPL
is shown in Figure 6. Two observations can be made: Firstly,
the real-time protection level is a rather inexact estimate of
the vertical position error, at least for this short measurement
interval. This suggests that the nominal error modeling used to
describe the Gaussian and bias terms used in the real-time VPL
are pessimistic. Those model parameters are URA and bmax.
Secondly, the prediction of the ARAIM VPL again exceeds
the actual measurement-based real-time VPL. This difference
is entirely founded in the error model applied to derive Dn,
which are URE and bnom.
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Figure 6. Nominal ARAIM VPL (Real-Time and Prediction)
E. ARAIM under fault conditions
Next, the results from feared event scenarios are presented.
In this section, only ARAIM without fault detection is applied,
which results in a position solution that uses the all-in-view
set of measurements and always contains any bias present
in the observations. In Figure 7, the instant when the ﬁrst
pseudorange ramp starts can clearly be estimated both from
a slope in the vertical position error (blue) and the real-time
VPL (green). Robustness can be guaranteed for this scenario
however, because ∀t : VPLRT > |∆x|.
It is worth mentioning that the current GEAS deﬁnition
for fault detection [7] declines integrity in the interval where
VPLRT > VPL, which results in a loss of availability. For
other types of applications than precision approach, it might
however desirable to obtain an error bound with low integrity
risk even in the presence of one or more large measurement
biases, even if the error bound is very large.
F. Fault Detection with ARAIM
When fault detection and exclusion is applied, the position
error can be reduced also in the presence of faults. The
following position errors result from processing the same fault
scenario with an extended version of ARAIM. The approach
uses the VPLRT > VPL test which is a simpliﬁed, but less
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Figure 7. Position error and ARAIM VPLs for the feared event scenario
strict version of the GEAS FD test (see Appendix A). If a fault
is detected, the lowest a-priori real-time VPL is determined
by sequential computation of ARAIM using measurement
subsets. A subset based ARAIM solution is only accepted if it
passes the VPLRT > VPL test after exclusion of the satellite. In
Figure 8, both FDE-based and MHSS-based protection levels
and position errors are jointly shown to allow for a direct
comparison.
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Figure 8. Position error and ARAIM VPLs for the two-faults scenario
It can be observed that after the bias has reached a certain
magnitude, the FD test included in the FDE algorithm effects
the attempt to exclude a measurement. While the bias is
only barely large enough to trigger the test, the exclusion is
unsuccessful - the prediction of the FDE VPL is larger due to
a reduced geometry, but the position error and the real-time
VPL are approximately the same as without FDE. Only after
the bias has grown larger, exclusion is successful. The position
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error reverts to a nominal level, and the real-time VPL is only
slightly larger than before the start of the bias.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The presented work demonstrates an implementation of
MHSS based ARAIM on a real-time GNSS receiver demon-
strator platform. Included in the MHSS approach was a
FDE function, where detection of large faults is based on
monitoring the partial solutions computed for the ARAIM
VPL. The introduction of MHSS and FDE involves a certain
extent of additional recursion which may impose limitations
to real time use of the algorithm. However in the operational
tests in GATE, current state-of-the-art PC hardware was able
to process 1Hz data including unconditional FDE recursion
in every epoch. Therefore it can be anticipated that future
avionics hardware will be able to cope with the computational
needs of ARAIM as it is currently envisioned.
Measurement in the GATE testbed were carried out to
demonstrate robustness of MHSS-ARAIM and FDE-ARAIM
against large measurement faults. Large bias ramps were there-
fore introduced to the GATE transmitter stations generating
two of the Galileo satellite signals while the user receiver was
recording data from eight Galileo satellites and the operational
GPS signal-in-space.
The MHSS based ARAIM results show that the computed
real-time VPL is always robust with respect to the vertical
error. However due to the large biases and the selected
geometry for the feared event, the vertical error is excessively
increased. Introduction of additional FDE can successfully and
reliably detect such biases even when multiple faults exist
concurrently. With the FDE detection result fed back into
position estimation, the navigation error remains small and
the performance loss with respect to the vertical error bound
VPL is marginal.
Although FDE introduces signiﬁcant additional complexity
to the ARAIM algorithm, it is not necessary to apply it in
order to assure integrity robustness in the presence of large
faults. Thus, potential limitations caused by implementation
constraints for avionics can be encountered by reducing the
frequency or depth of the FDE section of ARAIM.
A basic validation of the measurement error model using
data samples collected in GATE has been presented. However
with limited data available from a single receiver only, the
gained observations only allow for a coarse modeling of
nominal measurement errors. In the ARAIM results, it can be
observed that the margin between the position error and the
real time VPL, as well as the margin between real-time VPL
and predicted VPL are large. This suggests that the error model
is sufﬁciently conservative and might be adapted towards more
optimistic parameters when more data from a ground network
becomes available.
Future improvements of the presented real-time concept
may include exploiting the capability of using data generated
in the PVT and MHSS module to inﬂuence interference
mitigation, beamforming and tracking modules of the receiver.
The availability of DoA information suggests that a joint
evaluation of DoA, navigation data and range measurements
can improve robustness against threats that are currently not
in the scope of conventional MHSS RAIM.
APPENDIX A
COMPARISON OF FAULT DETECTION AND EXCLUSION
APPROACHES
This section shows that the use of a VPLRT > VPL based
fault detection is less conservative than the method proposed
in [7], which detects faults at a hypothesis level.
Assuming that the result of ARAIM yields
VPLRT > VPL , or (27)
maxVPLRT,j > maxVPLj , (28)
it follows that there exists one hypothesis where the partial
real-time VPL of this hypothesis is larger than the overall
prediction VPL:
∃j : VPLRT,j > VPL (29)
From (20) it follows that
∀j : VPL ≥ VPLj , (30)
and with (29) we have
∃j : VPLRT,j > VPLj . (31)
Using (16) and (19) we obtain
∃j : dj > Dj , (32)
and thus, the GEAS-FD test will fail every time the test
described in [13] fails. Vice versa, it implies that the GEAS-
FD test is more strict than the VPLRT > VPL based test and
should be preferred.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The author wishes to express his gratitude to all his col-
leagues involved in the GALANT project, who did a great job
in putting together an experimental GNSS receiver platform
and also put lots of effort into preparation and conduction
of the measurement campaign at GATE. My special thanks
goes to Dr. Andriy Konovaltsev and Carsten Becker who were
superior partners in integrating the receiver-side software with
the PVT and Integrity module.
Furthermore the author would like to thank Dr. Juan Blanch
from Stanford University for his continuing readiness to dis-
cuss aspects ARAIM implementations, the underlying assump-
tions and the framework for multiple constellation RAIM in
general.
Last, I would like to thank my colleagues Dr. Alexandru
Spletter who has given me a lot of opportunity to work on
novel FDE techniques for ARAIM, and Boubeker Belabbas
who is a reliable discussion partner, scientiﬁc advisor and
group leader.
International Technical Meeting (ITM) of The Institute of Navigation,  
Newport Beach, CA, January 30 ? February 1, 2012 1775
REFERENCES
[1] A. Ene, J. Blanch, and T. Walter, “Galileo-GPS RAIM for Vertical
Guidance,” in Proceedings of the Institute of Navigation’s National
Technical Meeting, Monterey CA, 2006.
[2] J. Blanch, A. Ene, T. Walter, and P. Enge, “An Optimized Multiple
Hypothesis RAIM Algorithm for Vertical Guidance,” in Proceedings of
the ION GNSS 2007 Conference, 2007.
[3] B. S. Pervan, S. P. Pullen, and J. R. Christie, “A Multiple Hypothesis
Approach to Satellite Navigation Integrity,” Journal of The Institute of
Navigation, vol. 45, no. 1, 1998.
[4] T. Walter and P. Enge, “Weighted RAIM for Precision Approach,”
in Proceedings of the ION GNSS Conference 1995. ION,
1995. [Online]. Available: http://waas.stanford.edu/~wwu/papers/gps/
PDF/wraim_tfw95.pdf
[5] M. Rippl, A. Spletter, and C. Günther, “Parametric Performance Study
of Advanced Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (ARAIM) for
Combined GNSS Constellations,” in Proceedings of the 2011 Interna-
tional Technical Meeting of the Institue of Navigation (ITM2011).
[6] FAA GEAS Panel, “GNSS Evolutionary Architecture Study:
Phase I - Panel Report,” Feb. 2008. [Online]. Available:
http://www.faa.gov/about/ofﬁce_org/headquarters_ofﬁces/ato/service_
units/techops/navservices/gnss/library/documents/media/GEAS_PhaseI_
report_FINAL_15Feb08.pdf
[7] ——, “Phase II of the GNSS Evolutionary Architecture Study,”
Feb. 2010. [Online]. Available: http://www.faa.gov/about/ofﬁce_org/
headquarters_ofﬁces/ato/service_units/techops/navservices/gnss/library/
documents/media/GEASPhaseII_Final.pdf
[8] S. Jan, W. Chan, T. Walter, and P. Enge, “Matlab Simulation Toolset
for SBAS Availability Analysis,” in Proceedings of the ION GNSS
Conference 2001, 2001.
[9] A. Ene, “Utilization of Modernized Global Navigation Satellite Systems
for Aircraft-Based Navigation Integrity,” Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford
University, Jun. 2009.
[10] M. Choi, J. Blanch, T. Walter, and P. Enge, “Advanced RAIM Demon-
stration Using Four Months of Ground Data,” in Proceedings of the
International Technical Meeting of the Institue of Navigation (ITM2011),
2011.
[11] M. Choi, J. Blanch, D. Akos, L. Heng, G. Gao, T. Walter, , and P. Enge,
“Demonstrations of Multi-constellation Advanced RAIM for Vertical
Guidance Using GPS and GLONASS Signals,” in Proceedings of the
24th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The
Institue of Navigatoin - ION GNSS, 2011.
[12] Website of the GATE testbed. [Online]. Available: http://www.
gate-testbed.com/
[13] A. Spletter and M. Rippl, “Novel Satellite Fault Isolation Method for
Real-Time Advanced RAIM Algorithms,” in Proceedings of the 24th
International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institue
of Navigatoin - ION GNSS, 2011.
[14] DLR Institute of Communications and Navigation (IKN). (2012)
GALANT - Galileo Antenna Demonstrator. [Online]. Available: http:
//www.dlr.de/kn/en/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-4306/6938_read-9224/
[15] M. Cuntz, A. Konovaltsev, M. Sgammini, C. Hättich, G. Kappen,
M. Meurer, A. Hornbostel, and A. Dreher, “Field Test: Jamming the DLR
Adaptive Antenna Receiver,” in Proceedings of the 24th International
Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institue of Navigatoin
- ION GNSS, 2011.
[16] C. Hättich, M. Cuntz, A. Konovaltsev, G. Kappen, and M. Meurer,
“Robust Multi-Antenna Acquisition in Time, Frequency and Space for a
Digital Beamforming Receiver,” in Proceedings of the 24th International
Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institue of Navigatoin
- ION GNSS, 2011.
[17] M. Cuntz, H. Denks, A. Konovaltsev, A. Hornbostel, A. Dreher, and
M. Meurer, “GALANT - Architecture Design and First Results of a
Novel Galileo Navigation Receiver Demonstrator with Array Antennas,”
in Proceedings of the ION GNSS Conference, 2008.
[18] A. Ene, “Multiple Hypothesis RAIM with Real-Time FDE and Fore-
casted Availability for Combined Galileo-GPS Vertical Guidance,” vol.
Proceedings of the European Navigation Converence - GNSS/TimeNav,
May 2007.
[19] J. Blanch, T. Walter, and P. Enge, “RAIM with Optimal Integrity and
Continuity Allocations Under Multiple Failures,” IEEE Transactions on
Aerospace and Electronic Systems, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 1235–1247, Jul.
2010.
[20] International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Annex 10, Aeronauti-
cal Telecommunications, Volume I (Radio Navigation Aids), Std., 2005.
[21] J. Blanch and T. Walter, “LPV-200 Requirements Interpretation, draft
paper,” 8. November 2011.
International Technical Meeting (ITM) of The Institute of Navigation,  
Newport Beach, CA, January 30 ? February 1, 2012 1776
